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ABSTRACT 
To what extent do Voting Advice Applications (VAA) have an influence on 
voting behaviour and to what extent should providers be hold accountable 
for such tools? This paper puts forward some empirical evidence from the 
Swiss VAA smartvote. The enormous popularity of smartvote in the last 
national elections in 2007 and the feedback of users and candidates let us 
come to the conclusion that smartvote is more than a toy and likely to have 
an influence on the voting decisions. Since Swiss citizens not only vote for 
parties but also for candidates, and the voting recommendation of 
smartvote is based on the political positions of the candidates, smartvote 
turns out to be particularly helpful. Political scientists must not keep their 
hands off such tools. Scientific research is needed to understand their 
functioning and possibilities to manipulate elections. On the bases of a 
legal study we come to the conclusion, that a science driven way of setting 
up such tools is essential for their legitimacy. However, we do not believe 
that there is a single best way of setting up such a tool and rather support a 
market like solution with different competing tools, provided they meet 
minimal standards like transparency and equal access for all parties and 
candidates. Once the process of selecting candidates and parties are 
directly linked to the act of voting, all these questions will become even 
more salient. 
 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Are Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) more than toys? And should political scientists be 
directly accountable for the VAAs they produce? These two questions are not easily 
addressed in a positivistic scientific manner. A toy is usually seen as an object used to play, 
but toys are also important tools for learning about the real world and promoting the process 
of socialisation. If VAAs should be more than toys this means that they have a direct impact 
on voting behaviour and therefore on the outcome of elections. In this sense it is no longer 
the aspect of ‘learning by playing’ but much more the aspect of being an important part of the 
real life elections and decision-making processes that are addressed. At this point the 
second question becomes important. If VAAs are to be taken seriously to what extent will 
their providers be accountable? Should they only be accountable for the quality of the tool 
itself or also for the outcome of the elections? Can a clear distinction be made between 
offering a new form of support for decision-making and influencing voting behaviour? 
 
This paper will not present final answers to these questions. By presenting some evidence 
from the National Center of Competence in Research: “Challenges to Democracy in the 21st 
Century” (NCCR Democracy), “smart-voting”1 research project on the functioning and the use 
of VAAs in Switzerland we hope to provide an input for further discussions. We will focus on 
the Swiss VAA smartvote (www.smartvote.ch).  
 
In Switzerland VAAs have become more and more popular since 2003, when smartvote and 
Politarena – a second VAA based on StemWijzer – were offered for the first time to the 
Swiss voters. During the run-up to the elections for the Swiss parliament in October 2007 
smartvote was used nearly 940’000 times. Compared to 2003 the use of smartvote was four 
times higher. Considering that there were only 2.3 million voters participating in 2007, the 
figures turn out to be even more impressive.  
 
The increasing use of VAAs can certainly be explained with the technical progress and the 
increase of Internet access. In 2006 over 75% of the Swiss population had access to the 
Internet.2  Beside the high rate of Internet access there are additional factors that are 
                                                
1  A research instrument of the Swiss National Science Foundation. 
2   See www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/16/04/key/approche_ 
globale.tables.30106.html [28/04/2008]. 
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fostering the popularity of VAAs. Political parties are facing severe challenges: within the last 
20 to 30 years traditional ties between voters and parties are loosening (see Dalton and 
Wattenberg 2000, Walgrave et al. 2008), the number of party members is decreasing and the 
volatility rate and the number of swing votes is rising. Dalton, for example, draws a quite 
pessimistic picture of representative, party-centred democracies with more and more citizens 
grown distrustful of politicians and disillusioned about the functioning of the democratic 
processes (see Dalton 2002 and 2007). Although it is still an open question to which degree 
this pessimistic picture of today’s representative democracies meets reality we assume that 
these developments – at least in their tendency – foster the use of VAAs, which are offering 
a customized and transparent new form of decision-making beyond the usual ways of 
selecting candidates and parties. In the case of Switzerland the electoral system, which is 
candidate-centred and offers voters extensive possibilities to express their political 
preferences by putting together a customized ballot, provides a further intensification of these 
effects. 
 
Before we go into more detail and present some first results of our research project on 
smartvote we will have a look at some characteristics of the Swiss electoral system (section 
2) and the functioning of smartvote (section 3). In sections 4 and 5 we will then present 
empirical evidence about the use of smartvote and the role and the importance attached to it 
by voters and candidates. Part 6 will focus on the accountability question and the limits of 
VAAs within the legal framework. The final section 7 offers a short conclusion and an outlook 
on further developments and questions, which should be raised on the basis of this paper. 
 
 
2. WHAT CAUSES THE DIFFERENCE? – ELECTIONS AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
IN SWITZERLAND 
 
Design and set-up of smartvote as well as its use by candidates and voters depend largely 
on the specific characteristics of the Swiss electoral system and the way Swiss citizens elect 
candidates and parties. 
 
The Swiss parliament consists of two chambers comparable with the US congress: the 
National Council (Nationalrat) as counterpart to the House of Representatives and the 
Council of States (Ständerat) as counterpart to the Senate. The National Council has 200 
 6 
 
 
 
seats and is elected under a proportional counting procedure, whereas the Council of State 
has 46 seats and is elected under a majoritarian counting procedure.3 Thus elections for the 
National Council are generally considered as party-oriented and the elections for the Council 
of States as candidate-oriented. 
 
Politics in Switzerland take place in a very fragmented social context. The country is divided 
into 26 cantons, which are the national electoral constituencies. The seats for the National 
Council are assigned to the cantons according their population size: the six smallest cantons 
have only one seat; whereas the canton of Zurich, the largest canton, has 34 seats. 
Accordingly, the number of candidates running for office differs from not more than one 
candidate in the canton of Uri to 804 in the canton of Zurich (Fivaz 2007 and Bundesamt für 
Statistik 2007). The cantons differ also in various other aspects: language, religion and 
economic structure. Subsequently cantonal party systems differ widely for example in regard 
to the number of parties and the degree of party competition (see Ladner 2004 and 2004b).  
 
A further aspect of the social and political heterogeneity of Switzerland is the fragmentation 
of the political parties (Ladner 2002). Switzerland has many parties with a relatively low 
share of the votes, parties are decentralised and the cantonal and local sections dispose of 
far-reaching autonomy. Furthermore it is not unusual that there exist different political 
position within one party. Even single candidates take positions autonomously (see table 10 
on page 20) and resist the dictate of their party leaders.  
 
While electing their members of parliament Swiss voters have the possibility to express their 
specific preferences for parties as well as for single candidates. First, every voter has as 
many votes as his constituency has seats (e.g. in the canton of Uri with 1 seat, voters have 1 
vote and in the canton of Zurich with 34 seats they have 34 votes). Secondly, voters can split 
their votes to different parties (e.g. in the canton of Zurich a voter can give 4 votes to party A, 
10 to party B and 20 to party C). Thirdly, voters can support their favourite candidates by 
giving them two votes instead of one (so-called cumulative voting, e.g. in the canton of Zurich 
a voter could vote for 17 candidates with two votes for each). In the sum these rules allow for 
composing a customized ballot according ones personal political preferences. 
                                                
3  There are some exceptions to these rules: The cantons with just one seat in the National 
Council conduct their elections in a majoritarian counting procedure and the canton of Jura uses the 
proportional counting procedure for the election of the Council of States as well. 
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Due to the fragmentation of the political and the party system Swiss voter can choose among 
a big number of parties and political positions, and quite often it is rather difficult to get to 
know all parties and candidates (particularly in a canton like Zurich with over 800 
candidates). Compared to a two-party-system it is definitely more costly to gather the 
necessary information about parties and candidates. Nevertheless Swiss voters seem to 
appreciate these possibilities increasingly. The share of swing voters has increased in the 
last years (see Linder 2005) as well as the share of those using the possibilities offered by 
the electoral system to compose their customized ballots according to their individual 
preferences (see Burger 2001). Here, candidate based VAAs like smartvote step in and offer 
the badly needed information for choosing appropriate parties and candidates.  
 
 
3. WHAT MAKES THE DIFFERENCE? SMARTVOTE AND OTHER VAAS 
 
As already mentioned, the two platforms Politarena and smartvote were placed at the 
disposal of the Internet public for the first time in 2003 on the occasion of the Swiss elections 
for the National Parliament. Politarena is based on the concept of the pioneer platform 
StemWijzer like the German Wahl-O-Mat and reached 135 000 users. smartvote has a 
somewhat different concept and has been the basis for other applications like Politikkabine, 
Koimipasva and Holyrood. In its first use in 2003 a modest number of 255 000 voting 
recommendations4 were made. This number, however, expanded to almost one million in 
2007. In the meantime Politarena has also been adapted as information tool for popular 
votes in Switzerland.5 
 
smartvote is neither one of the first nor the best-known VAA in Western Europe but it can be 
claimed that it is comprehensive in regard of its additional features as well as its extensibility. 
The main differences to its competitors (see Fivaz/Schwarz 2007: 6f) are: 
 
• smartvote is capable to manage multiple elections with overlapping constituencies at 
                                                
4  In Switzerland this is a prevalent term, which might be different in other countries, where VAAs 
come into use. 
5  In three popular votes in Switzerland (May 21, September 24 and November 26, 2006) 
Politarena had 37 209 users in total (see www.politik-digital.ch/archiv.htm [10/04/2008]). 
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the same time (e.g. one national, one cantonal and two local elections). 
• smartvote calculates voting recommendations according to the electoral system and 
constituency (electoral district)6 on both, the level of single candidates as well as on 
the level of lists/parties. 
• The smartvote-questionnaire - containing more than 70 questions - is more than twice 
as long as questionnaires used by other tools. Hence the recommendation is based 
on more empirical data and therefore more reliable. 
• Besides Kieskompas, smartvote is the only VAA, which includes additional visual 
analytical tools like the smartspider and the smartmap graphs (see figure 1 and figure 
2). 
• Finally, time series analyses are possible as all data of past elections are stored.  
 
Figure 1 smartspider of Radicals, Christian Democratic People’s Party and Green Party 
 
Source:  Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24th October 2007. 
 
                                                
6  StemWijzer for instance provides one for the whole election. In Switzerland not every party 
necessarily runs for election in every constituency and local and regional party sections might vary in 
their political positions, a significant voting recommendation has to include these specific 
circumstances. 
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Figure 2 smartmap of Swiss parties in the National Council 
 
Source:  Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24th October 2007. 
 
 
4. SMARTVOTE-PARTICIPATION 
 
Keeping the Swiss context in mind (sections 2 and 3) we would like to focus first on the 
question “Are VAAs more than Toys?”. To answer this question we suggest looking at the 
percentage of voters reached as well as at the participation of the candidates. The VAA 
participation by candidates is an essential precondition for the service value of smartvote. 
Without having almost all relevant candidates in the database, the service value for the 
citizens is rather low. To what extent do the candidates answer the smartvote questionnaire? 
What are the incentives to take part? 
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4.1 CANDIDATES 
 
As already mentioned in chapter 3, in the forefront of the National Council elections 2007 
smartvote was offered for the second time on national level after 2003. The percentage of 
candidates answering the 73 questions is a first evidence for the seriousness of the VAA 
smartvote. Table 1 highlights an outstanding increase of interest in smartvote in the National 
Council election 2007. Around 85 per cent of the 3100 candidates took part in smartvote and 
answered the questions. This high percentage made it possible to calculate and issue 
meaningful voting recommendations for the public.  
 
Thanks to media partnerships with relevant Swiss media (from SF DRS, NZZ Online to 
20Minuten)7 smartvote managed to enlarge its reach far beyond the Internet community. The 
media published articles and portrayed the candidates with the aid of the political profiles 
generated by smartvote or broadcasted telecasts or radio transmissions referring to the VAA 
smartvote or using the visual analytical tools like the so-called smartspider (see figure 1) in 
the print area. Media and the candidates depend on each other. On the one hand, 
candidates have a greater motivation to publish their political preferences in the VAA when 
they know that large media partners will spread their political profiles also in the print press 
and on the other hand, the media themselves have a direct interest to have a well-populated 
database at their disposal. 
 
                                                
7  See all media partners http://www.smartvote.ch/side_menu/partner/partners.php?who=v 
[28/04/2008]. 
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Table 1 smartvote-participation by candidates 2003 - 2008 
Elections 
Participation by 
candidates (per cent) 
Participation of elected 
MPs (per cent) 
Swiss parliament 2003 50.3 69.5 
Swiss parliament 2007 85.3 93.5 
Regional parliaments   
Canton of Thurgau 2004 62.9 77.7 
Canton of St. Gallen 2004 72.9 78.9 
Canton of Geneva 2005 75.1 91.0 
Canton of Berne 2006 63.0 83.4 
Canton of Zurich 2007 61.7 85.6 
Canton of Lucerne 2007 59.7 70.0 
Canton of St. Gallen 2008 85.0 91.7 
Local parliaments   
City of Berne 2004 70.1 83.8 
City of St. Gallen 2004 80.6 98.4 
City of Zurich 2006 57.4 93.6 
City of Winterthur 2006 50.4 78.3 
Source: smartvote (www.smartvote.ch). 
 
The remarkable participation of candidates and the high interest of media to publish 
contributions based on smartvote lead us to the conclusion that smartvote is more than a toy. 
Certainly both assign a sufficient degree of credibility to the VAA. Before we search for more 
evidence in this regard (see chapter 5.1), we will dress on the response to smartvote on the 
user side. Even the most sophisticated VAA remains unsuccessful when voters ignore it. 
How did the voters react to the VAA services in Switzerland? 
 
 
4.2 VOTERS 
 
To what extent do voters turn their attention towards smartvote? The absolute figures in table 
2 are not very impressing at first sight. The fact that the electorate of Switzerland counts only 
around 4.9 million voters (2007) changes this impression. The index, which relates smartvote 
users to the number of people voting (absolute number of voting recommendations per 
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election in relation to voter turnout), amounts to almost 40 per cent in 2007. The use on 
national level has thus almost quadrupled from 2003 to 2007. This evolution can partly also 
be ascribed to the repeated use on other levels (canton or local) and to the intense media 
coverage in 2007 already mentioned. 
 
Table 2 Use of smartvote 2003 - 2007 (selected elections) 
Elections  
smartvote use  
(absolute) 
smartvote use index1  
(per cent) 
Swiss parliament 2003 255’000 11.7 
Swiss parliament 2007 938’403 39.5 
Regional parliaments   
Canton of St. Gallen 2004 16’000 16.2 
Canton of Thurgau 2004 7’750 13.7 
Canton of Berne 2006 35’900 16.7 
Canton of Zurich 2007 30’465 10.4 
Canton of Lucerne 2007 9’864 9.1 
Local parliaments   
City of St. Gallen 2004 4’000 23.4 
City of Berne 2004 9’500 28.9 
City of Geneva 2005 22’900 24.9 
City of Zurich 2006 15’100 22.8 
1 smartvote use in absolute number relative to the according voter turnout 
Source: smartvote (www.smartvote.ch). 
 
Outstanding and rather unexpected are the participation rates at the different local city 
elections. With an average of 25 per cent the smartvote use index reaches a higher degree 
than on cantonal (state) level. This is somehow unexpected as local elections have generally 
smaller number of candidates and the value added by smartvote could be assumed to be 
smaller.  
 
What do candidates and users/potential voters really think about smartvote and how serious 
do they take it? The next section tries to answer these questions based on different surveys 
among candidates as well as among voters.  
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5. SIGNIFICANCE OF VVA SMARTVOTE 
 
5.1 CANDIDATES 
 
Parts of the post-electoral survey among Swiss candidates8 running for election for the 
National Council in 2007 were dedicated to the perception of smartvote. These questions will 
give us some ideas whether VAAs can be considered as toys.  
 
A large majority of the respondents insisted on the usefulness of smartvote for their election 
campaign. About 70 per cent considered their participation rather of use and nearly one-
fourth believed smartvote being explicitly advantageous. Nearly nobody perceived the VAA 
as damaging for the personal election outcome. 
 
Table 3 Advantage / damage by smartvote  
Advantage - damage estimation 
Responses by candidates 
 (per cent)
Explicit advantageous 23.7
Rather advantageous 45.8
Neither nor 28.9
Rather damaging 1.4
Explicit damaging 0.2
N = 1579 100.0
Source: NCCR Democracy, post electoral survey of candidates 2007. 
 
Interesting to note is the fact that the use of smartvote was even seen more advantageous 
by those who were not elected. Presumably these candidates were less prominent and had 
fewer possibilities to reveal their political positions otherwise. In any case they seem to 
blame other factors than the VAA for their electoral disappointment.  
 
                                                
8  Of the 1700 survey respondents around 95 per cent did (N=1'660) participate on smartvote. 
This survey has been realised in cooperation between the Universities of Berne, Geneva, Zurich and 
the IDHEAP in Lausanne. 
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Table 4 Advantage / damage by smartvote according to electoral success 
Council of States 
/ National Council 
Explicit 
advantageous 
(in %) 
Rather 
advantageous
(in %)
Neither 
nor (in 
%)
Rather 
damaging
(in %)
Explicit 
damaging 
(in %) 
N=
Not elected 24.4 46.0 28.1 1.4 0.1 1405
Elected 14.7 44.0 38.8 1.7 0.9 116
Total 23.7 45.8 28.9 1.4 0.2 1521
Source: NCCR Democracy, post electoral survey of candidates 2007. 
 
Are there different views regarding the added value through smartvote according to the size 
of the different voting districts (cantons)? As already mentioned in section 2, a voter of the 
canton of Zurich has to make his choice out of a much larger number of candidates than a 
voter of the canton of Jura (804 to 16). To get a voting recommendation for 34 seats out of 
804 candidates in Zurich might be a greater help than for 2 seats out of 16 candidates in 
Jura. Such expectations, however, cannot be confirmed. In the eyes of the candidates there 
are no striking differences amongst the different cantons (see table 5). However there is a 
different awareness between the language regions. The German speaking part agrees up to 
27 per cent on an explicit advantage, compared to only 12 per cent in the French part, where 
smartvote is still known to a lower extent. 
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Table 5 Advantage/damage by smartvote according to size of canton & language region 
Size of canton9 
/ Number of 
seats National 
Council 
Explicitly 
advantageous 
(in %) 
Rather 
advantageous 
(in %) 
Neither 
nor (in %) 
Rather 
damaging 
(in %) 
Explicit 
damaging  
(in %) 
N= 
1.00 / 16 + 24.2 45.8 27.8 1.9 0.3 677 
2.00 / 10 to 15 24.9 47.1 27.1 .8  0.0 361 
3.00 / 5 to 9 22.1 45.3 31.4 1.0 0.2 408 
4.00 / 1 to 4 21.3 42.7 34.7 1.3 0.0 75 
Total 23.7 45.8 28.9 1.4 0.2 1521 
 
Language  
Explicit 
advantageous 
(in %) 
Rather 
advantageous
(in %)
Neither 
nor (in %)
Rather 
damaging 
(in %)
Explicit 
damaging  
(in %) 
N=
German 27.0 46.1 25.2 1.5 0.2 1199 
French 12.1 47.0 39.9 .7 0.4 281 
Italian 4.9 29.3 63.4 2.4  0.0 41 
Total 23.7 45.8 28.9 1.4 0.2 1521 
Source: NCCR Democracy, post electoral survey of candidates 2007. 
 
With focus on the candidate perspectives the expectations that small parties – Green Liberal 
Party, Evangelical People's Party, and Swiss Democrats – believe particularly more in the 
use of smartvote seems to get confirmed. VAA offer smaller parties equal opportunities to 
present their candidates. However there is no party not assigning at least ‘rather’ an 
advantage to its participation on smartvote (table 6). So there seems to be a parallel to the 
findings of Walgrave et al. (2008) regarding an Belgian survey of a VAA in the form of a TV 
show: ‘Do the Vote Test’, where VAAs were taken rather seriously by political parties 
(Member of Parliaments respectively) as well. This finding led Walgrave et al. come to the 
conclusion that VAAs have to be taken seriously by political scientists as well. 
 
                                                
9  ‚1’ correspond to >900 000 inhabitants, ‚2’ correspond to 400 000 – 899 999, ‚3’ correspond to 
200 000 – 399 999, ‚4’ correspond to <199 999, see http://www.badac.ch/DE/news/typologies.html 
[28/04/2008]. 
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Table 6 Advantage, damage by smartvote participation according to party 
Parties 
Explicit 
advantageous
(in %)
Rather 
advantageous
(in %)
Neither 
nor (in 
%)
Rather 
damaging 
(in %) 
Explicit 
damaging
(in %)
N=
Christian Democrats  14.4 45.9 37.6 2.1   194
Radicals 25.1 38.4 34.0 2.5   203
Swiss People’s Party 24.2 40.3 33.3 1.6 0.5 186
Social Democrats 25.0 53.3 21.3 0.4   244
Green Party 27.9 44.7 26.6 0.8   244
Green Liberal Party 33.3 55.6 11.1     27
Liberal Party 21.7 52.2 26.1     23
Evangelical People’s Party 30.6 56.1 12.1 1.3   157
Federal Democratic Union 19.7 46.1 31.6 2.6   76
Rest 8.8 45.6 42.1 1.8 1.8 57
Total 23.7 45.8 28.9 1.4 0.2 1521
Source: NCCR Democracy, post electoral survey of candidates 2007. 
 
5.1.1 Importance of smartvote in the eyes of the candidates 
This paragraph gives a more detailed evaluation of the importance of smartvote from the 
candidates’ point of view. On a scale from 0 (‘no importance’) to 10 (‘great importance’) the 
average importance for the candidates amounts to 5.8 (see table 7). smartvote was probably 
not decisive for the candidates but at least perceived as meaningful. Interesting to note are 
the rather small differences between the parties. 
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Table 7 Attached importance of smartvote by parties (aggregated candidate answers) 
  Estimation of importance of smartvote for: 
   You personally? Your party? Media? The voter?
Christian Democrats Mean 5.68 5.55 6.59 5.83
  N 181 179 180 181
Radicals Mean 5.76 5.49 6.26 5.77
  N 197 189 192 193
Swiss People's Party Mean 5.79 5.55 6.53 6.37
  N 178 177 179 176
Social Democrats Mean 6.08 6.02 6.02 6.17
  N 226 221 224 223
Green Party Mean 5.71 5.99 6.30 6.22
  N 234 220 225 229
Total Mean 5.77 5.77 6.25 6.02
  N 1453 1412 1416 1423
Source: NCCR Democracy, post electoral survey of candidates 2007. 
 
If we split up the answers along the language regions within Switzerland the differences 
become more salient. In the German speaking part candidates attach a greater importance 
to smartvote (6.2 to 6.4) as in the French speaking part (3.8 to 5.8). In the German speaking 
part the VAA smartvote seems to be perceived as being more serious, but perhaps the lower 
importance is mainly due to the fact, that smartvote is not as well established in the French-
speaking part yet. 
 
Table 8 Attached importance of smartvote by languages 
  Estimation of importance of smartvote for: 
Language    You personally? Your party? Media? 
The 
voter? 
German Mean 6.36 6.20 6.40 6.29
  N 1133 1109 1107 1115
French Mean 3.76 4.36 5.84 5.19
  N 283 266 271 271
Italian Mean 2.92 3.03 4.76 4.24
  N 37 37 38 37
Total Mean 5.77 5.77 6.25 6.02
  N 1453 1412 1416 1423
Source: NCCR Democracy, post electoral survey of candidates 2007. 
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5.1.2 Party influence on candidates answering the questionnaire 
Do the candidates answer the 73 questions of the VAA on their own or do they follow party 
instructions? According to their own account slightly more than one-third of the respondents 
received instructions of their parties. Among the five biggest parties the candidates of the 
‘left-wing’ Social Democrats received by far more often instructions (56.6 per cent of the 
respondents) compared to only 20.5 per cent of the candidates of the ‘right-wing’ Swiss 
People's Party.  
 
Table 9 Guidance/direction by the party 
Guidance / direction by the party:  
Parties 
Obtained in % Not obtained in % N =
Christian Democrats 37.9 62.1 190
Radicals 41.6 58.4 202
Swiss People's Party 20.5 79.5 185
Social Democrats 56.6 43.4 242
Green Party 17.0 83.0 247
CH 35.4 64.6 1521
Source: NCCR Democracy, post electoral survey of candidates 2007. 
 
Receiving instructions does not necessarily mean that all candidates finally followed them 
when they answered the 73 smartvote questions. Approximately 45 per cent followed at least 
partially the instructions and some 10 per cent strongly. If the candidates received 
instructions the extent to which they followed them does not vary strongly between the 
different parties. 
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Table 10 Compliance of the party guidance/instructions for answering the questionnaire 
Parties 
Strong 
adherence 
in % 
Partial 
adherence 
in % 
Hardly 
adherence 
in %
No 
adherence  
at all  
in %  
N=
Christian Democrats 5.6 40.8 26.8 26.8 71
Radicals 4.8 38.1 29.8 27.4 84
Swiss People's Party 10.5 34.2 34.2 21.1 38
Social Democrats 3.6 48.2 21.2 27.0 137
Green Party 15.4 38.5 20.5 25.6 39
CH 9.1 44.7 24.8 21.4 528
Source: NCCR Democracy, post electoral survey of candidates 2007. 
 
What did influence the candidates most while answering the 73 questions? Table 11 reveals 
interesting results. Most important with an average of 9.1 (‘0’ = no importance; ‘10‘ most 
important) is the candidate’s own political position, followed by the position of the party. The 
assumed political positions of the electorate are on the average not seen as very important 
(average of 3.6 only), which seems to negate the assumption of vote catching. The parties or 
in this case the candidates do not follow the public as it is depicted in other studies (see 
Walgrave et al. 2008). Once more there are no important differences between the candidates 
of the different parties. 
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Table 11 Points of reference for answering the smartvote-questionnaire  
  Points of reference attached to: 
Parties   
Your party 
(party 
program) 
Your party 
colleagues 
The other 
parties 
Your own 
political 
positions 
The assumed 
political 
positions of 
your 
electorate 
Christian Democrats Mean 5.24 3.45 2.58 9.02 3.99
  N 184 185 183 184 183
Radicals Mean 4.66 3.21 2.01 9.10 3.73
  N 199 199 197 198 196
Swiss People's Party Mean 5.84 3.49 2.15 9.09 3.84
  N 179 177 177 181 178
Social Democrats Mean 5.41 3.51 2.20 9.44 3.30
  N 242 241 240 240 238
Green Party Mean 4.68 3.40 2.03 9.44 2.70
  N 231 229 230 233 230
Total Mean 5.32 3.64 2.27 9.09 3.57
  N 1473 1466 1460 1475 1460
Source: NCCR Democracy, post electoral survey of candidates 2007. 
 
What about the perception of smartvote by the voters? It is not enough to have media 
partners and candidates participating, the tool needs also to be used by the citizens.  
 
 
5.2 VOTERS 
 
In the NCCR Democracy research project ‘smart voting’ we not only have a closer look at the 
candidates using smartvote but also at the users and potential voters. This can either be 
done through the information the users reveal once they have entered the website or it can 
be done through additional surveys. Since most of the data for the 2007 national elections 
are not available yet we also present here results from earlier elections on cantonal level. 
 
The users of smartvote are left-wing computer literates, i.e. they are younger, predominately 
male, better educated and rather vote for the Social Democrats. Between 2003 and 2007 the 
percentage of female users increased from 24.1 (N=1297) to 32.5 (N=13308) per cent. 
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Similarly smartvote has become a little bit more popular among people above fifty years of 
age (see figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 The age of the users: national elections 2003 & 2007 (percentages) 
0.0
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Age Groups
NC 2003 NC 2007   
N 2003 =1279, N 2007 = 13277 
Source: Post-election survey National Council elections 2007. 
 
Table 12 reveals the strong bias towards the Social Democrats. More than forty per cent of 
the users in 2007 voted for the Social Democrats in 2003. In the 2003 elections the Social 
Democrats only scored around 23 per cent. This table, which is based on a pre-election 
survey, also reveals the loss of the Social Democrats suffered in 2007 but it does not reveal 
the gains of the Swiss People’s Party. By combining such survey results with the information 
the users leave on the website, however, we might be able to gather information which could 
help to predict and understand the results ahead. 
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Table 12 Users party preferences & results of the National elections 2007  
Parties  
Voted for 
in 2003 
Voted 
in 2007
Diff. Results 2007
Christian Democrats 8.7 10.1 1.4 14.5
Radicals 17.2 14.4 -2.8 15.8
Swiss Peoples Party 14.2 9.4 -4.8 28.9
Social Democrats 42.1 28.7 -13.4 19.5
Greens 11.4 17.8 6.4 9.6
Green liberal party 0 7.2 7.2 1.4
N= 8506 16611    
Source: NCCR Democracy, pre- & post electoral survey of smartvote users 2007. 
 
And what do the users think about smartvote? According to our survey conducted in the 
2006 cantonal elections in Berne, the users found smartvote – despite its complexity – user 
friendly (93.6 per cent), credible and easy to follow (86.9 per cent), and found their own 
position described in a plausible manner (88.3 per cent). Almost all (98.5 per cent) of the 
about 900 respondents of the user-survey stated that they will use smartvote again in the 
course of the next elections to come. 
 
Did smartvote matter? According to the same survey about 75 per cent of the respondents 
(N=887) claim that smartvote influenced their voting decision. About one third voted for 
another party as usual, 30 per cent reconsidered their political preferences and 15 per cent 
put candidates from other lists on their party list.  
 
Based on first results of another survey among the VAA users of the National Council 
elections 2007 in Switzerland even 40 per cent did split their vote (see table 13). An 
overwhelming majority also claims that smartvote helped them to make up their decisions, 
was the most important information source (57 per cent) among other sources like 
newspapers, political events, party/candidate advertisement by mail etc. (see table 14). 
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Table 13 Did you split vote and/or cumulate candidates while filling in your ballot paper for the  
  National Council election? 
Answer option Absolute number In per cent
No change of the ballot paper at all 3110 11.2
Candidates elected of different lists (split voted) 11371 40.8
Several candidates elected twice (cumulative 
voted) 8865 31.8
Several candidates cancelled 4490 16.1
I can't remember 37 0.1
Total 27873 100.0
Source: NCCR Democracy, post electoral survey of smartvote users 2007. 
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Table 14 How important was the following election campaign instrument for getting information  
  about parties and candidates for you? 
Instrument Important 
Rather 
important 
Rather 
unimportant 
Unimportant N = 
The VAA smartvote 
10175
57.3%
5190
29.2%
1595
9.0%
800 
4.5% 
17760 
100.0%
Newspaper advertisement of parties 
and candidates 
723
4.2%
3634
20.9%
5538
31.9%
7472 
43.0% 
17367
100.0%
Political event of their parties 
719
4.2%
2103
12.2%
3647
21.2%
10722 
62.4% 
17191
100.0%
Stand of parties and candidates on 
the street 
364
2.1%
1309
7.6%
3987
23.1%
11627 
67.3% 
17287
100.0%
Election Internet pages of parties 
and candidates 
2249
12.9%
4860
27.9%
4062
23.3%
6273 
36.0% 
17444
100.0%
Posters in the streets 
547
3.1%
2396
13.7%
5643
32.3%
8882 
50.8% 
17468
100.0%
Advertisement of parties and 
candidates in the letterbox 
863
4.9%
2554
14.6%
4460
25.5%
9629 
55.0% 
17506
100.0%
Online-Media 
6487
38.1%
5171
30.3%
2639
15.5%
2742 
16.1% 
17039
100.0%
Supraregional and national TV 
Station respectively 
4612
27.0%
5884
34.4%
2855
16.7%
3754 
21.9% 
17105
100.0%
Local TV Station 
1140
6.9%
2282
13.9%
3424
20.8%
9577 
58.3% 
16423
100.0%
Supraregional and national radio 
station respectively 
2508
14.9%
4172
24.8%
4013
23.9%
6112 
36.4% 
16805
100.0%
Local radio station 
796
4.8%
2051
12.3%
3827
23.0%
9976 
59.9% 
16650
100.0%
Supraregional and national 
newspapers respectively 
4631
26.9%
5897
34.3%
3568
20.8%
3098 
18.0% 
17194
100.0%
Local newspapers 
3563
20.6%
4616
26.7%
4197
24.3%
4926 
28.5% 
17302
100.0%
Source: NCCR Democracy, post electoral survey of smartvote users 2007. 
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5.3 CONCLUSION 
 
The Swiss experiences with www.smartvote.ch, the participation of an overwhelming 
majority of the candidates and our survey results led us to the conclusion that VAAs in 
Switzerland – contrary to the findings for Belgium (Walgrave et al. 2008) –are more than a 
tool for checking the voters existing preference without having any influence on their voting 
behaviour. Of course, our survey results are somewhat biased. Nevertheless we dare to say 
– and will focus on that issue in later analyses – that VAAs in Switzerland tend to lead to an 
increase of split voting and might – in the long run - even bring other candidates and parties 
into office.  
 
There are probably different reasons for the bigger impact of VAAs in Switzerland. First of 
all, the Swiss (multi-party) electoral system, where a voter can not only vote for a party but 
can also express his preferences for particular candidates, makes VAAs a very useful 
source of political information. It provides a real service for voters, who have to make up 
their mind among quite a few and sometimes up to several hundred candidates and more 
than a dozen parties (see details in section 2). Secondly the participation rate of over 85 per 
cent in the smartvote-database is interesting for the media coverage to use smartvote as a 
new source of information – particularly the eye-catching visual analysis of the so-called 
smartspider and smartmap. Finally the media interest in the VAA amplifies also the interest 
and provokes even some sort of ‘pressure’ to be represented in such a tool as candidate or 
party.  
 
Because VAAs can be more than a toy, political scientists should not stay away from them. 
It is also their responsibility that such tools are set up as transparently as possible on the 
grounds of scientific knowledge about political issues and the political space. In order to 
prevent possible distortions these tools have to be researched continuously. In so far, 
scientists are accountable. In the following section we will now focus in greater detail on this 
normative question. 
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6. SHOULD PROVIDERS OF VAAS BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR WHAT THEY 
OFFER? 
 
On the bases of a legal study (Rütsche 2008), which was also part of our research project we 
shall try to answer the accountability question. According to Rütsche’s findings in the case of 
Switzerland the use of VAAs has first of all to be reviewed in the light of the right to free and 
undistorted opinion formation, guaranteed by Article 34 (section 2) of the Federal 
Constitution. On this basic right dimension it is mainly a question of potential dangers of 
distortion of the democratic opinion formation and decision-making by VAAs. In a worst-case 
scenario they become an instrument for political manipulation of particular private interests. If 
VAA providers are members of (or affiliated to) pressure groups for instance, the potential of 
abuse increases enormously. Even if there is no worry of real manipulation, VAAs could 
distort the voter’s will solely due to the composition of its content. However, in principle this 
right to free and undistorted opinion formation does not totally prohibit private propaganda or 
even false information in the run-up to elections. The constitutional limits are only 
transgressed if private actors propagate obviously false information to influence the electoral 
opinion formation one-sidedly. The basic idea of VAAs is to inform the voter about political 
positions of candidates and/or parties. The goal of that information is even to influence the 
opinion formation of the voters. As long as this influence is based on objective political 
information it is not only allowed but also desirable. But having power to form opinions 
implies a danger of abuse. Hence, VAA providers holding this power could systematically 
take advantage of it for certain political purposes. Therefore the question of accountability is 
crucial. In a first step Rütsche (2008: 17f.) focuses on dangers by (private) providers before 
he then highlights the responsibility of another actor, the state in this context. According to 
the author it comes to systematic forgery by VAA providers in cases where: 
 
a) Tendentious questionnaires occur. Certain political orientations and parties are 
favoured or discriminated. However, putting into perspective this argument, too one-
sided weights of political issues would be noticed by the candidates and voters and 
therefore it is rather a minor danger. 
 
b) Single candidates were replaced before the user sees his voting recommendation. 
For a voter the accuracy of a voting recommendation - except amateurish forgery - is 
difficult to identify. However, this real danger can be diminished by several VAAs (with 
comparable methods) on one ‘election market’. This is a not yet solved risk in 
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Switzerland, as the VAAs Politarena and smartvote are lacking of the possibility of 
comparison due to their methodological differences. 
 
c) The VAA discriminates a single candidate or party. For instance, not all candidates, 
parties respectively have the same access to the tool. However, also applying 
different modalities of information regarding the VAA or excluding answered 
questions are further forms. But real one-sided influencing exists only in case of 
‘hidden’ discrimination. Under constitutional law unacceptable are so-called ‘political 
neutral’ VAAs, which give not access to all candidates and parties. Nevertheless a 
VAA can include only certain candidates, parties as long as this is declared 
transparently.  
 
Even if there is never a purely objective method of costructing a VAA, systematic forgery is 
no obligatory consequence. A VAA shall translate political preferences of voters into a 
concrete voting decision, like any traditional instrument of opinion formation. These are 
normally not more accurate than any VAA. Many voters generally even pronounce a decision 
without knowing exactly their own political preferences and that of the candidates. Nobody 
then speaks of distortion of opinion formation. Hence, using VAAs for identifying political 
preferences as precisely as possible has nothing to do with forging the opinion formation. 
However, there is a claim for certain (scientific) VAA quality standards. Fading out or 
inadequate weighting of particular political issues – even in a standardised questionnaire - 
provokes a bias in the opinion formation. Also a lack of the number of questions to every 
political issue or leading questions causes tendencies. Finally, any inexact calculation 
method of the matching of voter and candidate responses entail the very same problem. 
According to Rütsche (2008) all these risks can be reduced through a competitive VAA 
‘election market’ but would need certain minimal standards: 
• Transparency regarding sponsoring, financing and methodology. 
• Quality and operation standards implementation. 
 
To what extent must the state be accountable in Switzerland? According to the court 
incumbent authorities are not allowed to advise the voter of any kind. However, contributions 
to the election campaign can increase the quality of opinion formation, if they lead to more 
balanced information – in the meaning of a ‘vital’ democracy. Therefore it is not a question 
of ‘whether’ but rather of ‘how’ state intervention might happen. In the context of elections 
there is a strict imperative of equal treatment. As long as state intervention stays neutral (no 
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preference or discrimination for one single candidate or party), objective and factual, state 
regulations regarding VAAs are constitutional.  
 
The association of VAAs with electronic voting is of particular concern, for instance at the 
occasion of the Bernese student council elections in 2005. The Federal Supreme Court 
confirmed with its judgement that the State must remain strictly neutral in elections and must 
treat all candidates and parties equally. Connection with VAAs is therefore only possible 
under restrictive conditions: an organizational, personal and financial independence of 
officially promoted VAAs from political parties and interest groups; as well as high standards 
regarding a tool’s quality and operation. Given such conditions, the official promotion of 
specific VAAs would lead to regulatory complications; and in order to avoid these, the 
deregulation of the ballot system might be proposed to facilitate the use of VAAs by the 
electorate. This would enable the users of such tools to print their individual electoral 
recommendations or send them electronically as valid ballots.  
 
In summary the legal imperatives for state involvement in the run-up to elections reduce the 
range of opportunity for action enormously but by providing a legal framework for VAA 
without running it themselves; the state can contribute to increased accountability of VAA 
tools without influencing the election campaign directly and therefore the election outcome.  
 
Apart from the right to free and unadulterated opinion formation, there are also institutional 
provisions of the Constitution. In Switzerland, the Constitution contains a range of 
guarantees that accord the political parties a special role in the electoral process. Among 
these guarantees is Article 137, according to which parties are to participate in public 
opinion formation. Further, Article 149 (see section 2) allows for proportional representation 
in National Council elections. If a large number of voters use VAAs, the proportional 
representation system could be undermined. The individual electoral recommendations of 
candidates compete with the party lists. As candidate VAAs give a strong impetus to ticket 
splitting (see section 5.2). This is not illegal but it could become a conflict for the 
constitutional principle of proportional representation, which presupposes that voters make 
an initial choice between party lists. Consequently, the state should not promote VAAs 
unless they also offer voting by party lists as an option. 
  
Moreover, it needs to be asked whether VAAs lead to greater responsiveness of 
representative bodies to the voters. Prima facie responsiveness can be strengthened. 
However, there are no institutional safeguards to ensure that politicians once elected 
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actually support the positions that they declared through the VAA. Under this arrangement, 
reference back to the will of the electorate is limited to the act of voting. Possibilities are 
thereby opened for politicians to strategically use VAAs for their own purposes. From a 
constitutional perspective, this is why it is desirable for such tools to involve a monitoring of 
the voting behaviour of politicians while in office (in Switzerland the NCCR Democracy 
project smartmonitor has exactly this intention). Once a VAA like smartvote is connected 
with a monitoring system like smartmonitor this negative potential can be reduced 
remarkably. 
 
To sum up, the degree of accountability differs among the different actors. As private VAA 
providers have to maximise the content of the VAA, their quality and transparency 
respectively, the state can only provide assistance and control limited by its legal 
restrictions. In short VAA providers are accountable for maximising the quality of their tool. 
As VAAs are considered as one out of several information sources in the election campaign 
they cannot be made accountable for the election outcome on their own. The state in 
contrast can only provide the legal framework for VAAs and try to legally minimise potential 
manipulations. Accountability for the tool is therefore shared between the provider (content, 
quality, transparency) and the state (legal framework); accountability for the final election 
outcome can only be all actors together within an election campaign and should be matter of 
future analysis in this context. 
 
 
7. OUTLOOK 
 
After the success of three pilot projects in the Swiss cantons (GE, NE, ZH) the Federal 
Council defines on May, 31 2006 electronic voting as a strategic goal which he wants to 
implement step by step. Once we vote electronically in Switzerland – so we would like to 
argue – VAAs will become indispensable and will have a considerable influence on party 
politics. After having selected candidates in a ‘smart’ way, citizens will want to send the list 
to the polls electronically. VAAs will no longer be considered as a toy but as a useful 
instrument to select parties and candidates. This, of course, leads to new problems and 
challenges. We do not believe that it will be possible to agree on ‘politically correct’ 
questions, which all parties accept in their wordings, or that a state office should be 
responsible for the questions put forward by the VAAs. We rather think that the voters 
should have a choice between different VAAs. It is up to the voters to decide which VAA is 
trustworthy and which voting advice they will follow. We do believe, however, that 
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transparency and equal access to the VAAs is required. Only those VAAs meeting such 
minimal standards should be directly linked to the electronic ballot station. Political scientists 
are badly needed to research and investigate the functioning of VAA. Their findings will help 
to improve the quality to the VAAs and to shed light on the possibilities to manipulate with 
such tools. Scientists, however, cannot take over the responsibility for the results of the 
elections and the social consequences of these results. Who knows for sure which party is 
best for the society in the long run? VAAs are one source of information about politics, but 
among others.  
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